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Electricity transmission contracts allocate scarce resources, allow hedging 
against locational price differences and provide information to guide 
investment. Liquidity is increased if all transmission contracts are defined 
relative to one balancing point, then a set of two contracts can replicate any 
point to point contract. We propose an algorithm and apply it to the European 
electricity network to identify a well connected balancing point that exhibits 
minimal relative cross-price responses and hence reduces market power 
exercised by generation companies. Market level data which is difficult to 
obtain or model such as price levels in different regions or that is dependent 
on the time scale of interaction, as demand elasticity, is not required. The only 
critical input quantity are assumptions on future transmission constraint 
patterns.  
 
1 Introduction 
Electricity transmission networks are frequently congested; market design 
addresses this issue either by defining physical transmission contracts which grant 
access rights to scarce resources or by integrating the allocation of transmission in 
the energy market under schemes like nodal pricing (Schweppe et. al. 1988), 
market splitting (Christie and Wangensteen 1998) or market coupling. These 
integrated design approaches allow for a more efficient use of the network in the 
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presence of uncertainty and reduce the exercise of market power (Boucher and 
Smeers 2001, Neuhoff 2003). However, they need to be complemented with longer 
term (financial) transmission contracts for two reasons: first, they allow agents to 
sign long-term energy contracts if they are located at different parts of the network 
and would otherwise be exposed to uncertain locational energy price differences 
(Hogan 1992). Second, they provide information about future flow patterns to guide 
generation and transmission investment. In addition to this, transmission 
contracts enable grid promoters to hedge investment costs of a line by selling long-
term transmission contracts in advance of the construction of the line. 
Transmission contracts may pose, however, an obstacle to a competitive electricity 
market if they induce generation companies holding these contracts to exercise 
more market power (Cardell et.al. 1997, Borenstein et.al. 2000). In order to prevent 
this from happening, it is important that transmission contracts do not represent 
an extra incentive for agents to exercise their market power (Joskow and Tirole 
2000). One approach discussed in Gilbert, Neuhoff and Newbery (2003) is to use 
specific allocation mechanisms, like a uniform price auction, to ensure that profit- 
maximizing generators only obtain transmission contracts that reduce their 
market power. However, with asymmetric information and uncertainty this 
approach does not seem to be sufficient and hence a restriction on holding 
transmission contracts might be required. One approach to further limit the 
potential exercise of market power is to choose one balancing point in the system 
towards which all transmission contracts are defined. Generation companies would 
be restricted to obtaining transmission contracts from the location of their 
generation facility to this balancing point and consumers would then obtain a 
transmission contract from the balancing point to their demand location.  
Transmission contracts defined in this way have a number of advantages. Probably 
the most important one is the preventive effect that they may have on the exercise 
of market power. In addition, a lower number of transmission contracts are 
necessary. Instead of defining contracts between any two points, it is enough to 
define one contract per node in the system. This will increase the liquidity of 
transmission markets. Also related to this, these transmission contracts increase 
the number of trades among agents that do not have to be mediated through a 
centralized institution, which is required to redefine different contracts. 
The impact of a balancing point for transmission contracts on the exercise of 
market power can be either positive or negative, however. The incentive for an 
agent located at any node to exercise market power will depend on the price change 
induced at the balancing point by a marginal increase in the output at this node. 
Transmission contracts defined using a balancing point could therefore change the 
exercise of market power in three different ways. First, the increase in the energy 
price at the balancing point may be smaller than that at the node where the agent 
decreasing its output is located. In this case, ownership of transmission contracts 
means that this agent will have sold in advance part of its energy at a more or less 
fixed price. Hence, it would have less incentive to exercise its market power than if 
it had not acquired these contracts. 
Second, the increase in the price of energy may be the same at the agent’s node and 
at the balancing point. Here transmission contracts will have no effect on the 
exercise of market power. Third and last, if the increase in the price of energy is 
larger at the balancing point, agents owning transmission contracts will have an 
incentive to withhold generation capacity. The value of their portfolio of 
transmission contracts would increase when they reduce output. 
From this analysis, an important conclusion must be drawn. The price of energy at 
the balancing point should be as independent from the unilateral output decisions 
taken by agents as possible. Our search for a node that can be used as a balancing 
point has been driven mainly by the fact that this node must fulfill this criterion. 
The best-suited node according to this criterion would be unconnected to the 
network and hence exhibit no correlation with any price in the network. However, 
in this case a transmission contract would not only cover the risk of locational price 
differences, but also the usually higher risk of the overall price level. This would 
create two complications. First, the credit risk associated with such long-term 
contracts would increase drastically and hence complicated credit guarantees 
would be required which would preclude some agents from acquiring transmission 
contracts. Second, given the significant price-level risk covered by transmission 
contracts, agents would have to achieve a close match between their trade positions 
and the contracts they hold. This would eliminate the advantage of financial 
transmission contracts in environments of moderate transmission congestion 
expectations. Agents achieve sufficient hedging for locational price differences if 
the contracts cover approximately energy delivery, allowing the market aggregated 
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contracts over a longer period of time, reducing transaction costs and increasing 
liquidity in the market. 
Consequently, an additional criterion is required to capture the correlation of the 
energy price at the balancing point with energy prices in the remaining system.  
In the US contracts can be signed for all locations while market designs like PJM 
allow market participants to obtain transmission contracts between any two 
locations to hedge for the corresponding locational price differences. Still, the 
attraction of trading at liquid markets reinforces the liquidity of the two main 
trading hubs. Thus, the exchange clearinghouse offers a monthly futures contract 
for electricity transactions based on the daily floating price at the PJM western 
trading hub. The PJM western hub consists of 111delivery points, primarily on the 
Pennsylvania Electric Co. and the Potomac Electric Co. utility transmission 
systems. Additional hedging opportunities are provided by means of options on this 
contract.(NYMEX, 2004). 
We suggest retaining the liberty to trade at any location in the network, but 
propose to implement restrictions on transmission contract ownership. Such 
restrictions seem to be justified, because they complement an implicit restriction on 
the TSO in the transmission contract auction. The TSO is required to sell to any 
interested party transmission contracts as long as the net-contract volume results 
in a feasible flow pattern. Dominant generation companies can use mixed strategy 
bids in discriminatory auctions or possibly asymmetric information to obtain 
transmission contracts below the value these contracts are expected to obtain in 
the hands of these dominant traders. An arbitrageur would never issue such 
contracts, but the TSO would be required to do so. Hence the market design needs 
to correct for this constraint on the TSO behavior, e.g. by imposing a constraint on 
transmission contract ownership.  
This more restrictive market design might be more important in Europe than in 
some of the US markets for two reasons. First, because the regional concentration 
of generation ownership is higher in Europe than in most of the liberalized US 
states. Secondly, because the regulators and competition authorities in Europe do 
not have the power of their US counterparts to intervene if the exercise of market 
power results in the deviation of prices from their competitive level.  
 
2  Methodology and assumptions 
Once we have determined the characteristics that the balancing point should have, 
we are in the position to decide which of the nodes of a large system such as the 
European one can qualify as balancing points. We computed relative cross-price 
responses for this system and a particular set of operating conditions 
corresponding to available data of the real operation of the system on January 17, 
2001 at 10.30 am. The term cross-price response refers to the change in price at a 
certain node when the output at another node, hereafter referred to as the 
generation node, decreases by one unit. In order to compute the change in price at 
every node in the system we solve an economic dispatch based on the nodal pricing 
equations where some assumptions have been made that are explained in the 
following paragraphs. Relative cross price responses are the ratio between the 
change in price at any node and that at the generation node. Cross price responses 
are the solution of a linear equation system resulting from the traditional nodal 
pricing equations by algebraic manipulation. 
We made the following assumptions in our model. First, active constraints remain 
binding once the power output at a certain node changes. Second, the net demand 
jx  at any node j=1...N in the system reacts to the price of energy according to a 
linear model: 
                                                         ,                                                        (1)j j j jx D pα= −
where D
j
 is the intercept, jα  is the net demand slope and pj is the price of energy at 
this node. We assume that net demand slope jα  is proportional to the power 
generation at node j in accordance with the fact that most of the elasticity comes 
from the generation and not the demand side. We will show at the end of the 
section, that the proportionality factor does not affect the variables we will assess – 
relative cross price responses. As the appropriate proportionality factor would be 
difficult to determine and crucially depend on the time scale we are assessing, this 
independence facilitates the analysis. We are only interested in the marginal 
changes, hence the use of a linear demand function (1) in the algebra does not 
restrict the results from being equally valid for other functional forms. In fact, the 
actual output curves of generators are far from being linear. Most of them, though 
not all, either operate at their maximum capacity or do not produce any power. As 
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we are assessing the impact of market power we should also  anticipate that 
generation companies submit bid schedules that provide for less price 
responsiveness than the marginal cost curve of their generation assets would 
suggest. For example a Cournot bid does not provide any price responsiveness of 
output. Such behavior could be represented in our model by adjusting demand 
slope jα with e.g. the regional HHI index of generation companies. It is part of 
future research to assess how such correction factors on jα  change the optimal 
balancing point. 
Third, because the TSOs did not indicate which links were actually congested, we 
estimated the state of each line based on the ratio of the flow over the line to its 
capacity. Those lines with a flow to capacity ratio above 0.7 where assumed to be 
congested. The absolute capacity of a link does not affect the results, whereas we 
will discuss at the end of section 3.1 how the choice of constraints that are assumed 
to be binding can influence the results. 
Finally, our computations include only one of those constraints that are highly 
collinear among themselves: We consider that each of these constraints represent 
the same limitation. Only after discarding highly collinear constraints were we 
able to solve the set of linear equations presented in (2), (3) and (4) in order to 
obtain cross-price responses. 
We now calculate cross-price responses as resulting from traditional nodal pricing 
equations (Schweppe et. al. 1988) corresponding to an optimal power flow (Wood 
and Wollenberg 1984).
2
 The global balance between load and generation in the 
system implies that the sum over all net-inflows equals the transmission losses, 
which we assume to be zero in our analysis: 
                                                                 0,                                                          (2)j
j
x =∑
We assume that marginal output changes of a generator in the system with the 
resulting market reaction will not change the set of constrained lines C. Hence the 
net transmission on constrained links equals transmission capacity Kl. At the same 
time, net transmission equals the sum  of all outflows xj multiplied with the 
fraction jlγ  of the outflow that crosses link l on its way to the reference node. The 
                                                
2
 An alternative market design of bilateral trading is described in Chao and Peck (1996). 
reference node is the one that we have taken as the reference for computing energy 
prices. Hereafter, it is represented as  r: 
                                                    ,                                                   (3)j jl l
j
x K l Cγ− = ∀ ∈∑
 The market-clearing price at node j equals the price at the reference node r plus 
the marginal value of capacity between nodes j and r. The marginal value of 
capacity between nodes j and r  is given by the sum over all constrained links of the 
Lagrange multiplier lρ  associated with the restriction on the power flow for link l 
(equation (3))   scaled with the fraction jlγ  of the power flowing from the reference 
node r to node j across the link l:
3
  
                                                     ,                                                   (4)j r jl l
l C
p p jγ ρ
∈
= + ∀∑
Substituting (1) in equations (2), (3) and (4) and differentiating with respect to the 
intercept of the net demand D
i
 at generation node i, gives the following linear 
equation system for each generation node i that is considered: 
,
                                                  1,                                        (5)lrj j jl
j j l Ci i
p
D D
ρ
α α γ
∈
∂∂
+ =
∂ ∂∑ ∑
 
,
                                   ,                              (6)mrj jl j jl jm il
j j m Ci i
p l C
D D
ρ
α γ α γ γ γ
∈
∂∂
+ = ∀ ∈
∂ ∂∑ ∑
The equation system represented by (5) and (6) consists of C+1 linear equations 
with C+1 variables and thus can easily be solved by means of conventional 
algebraic matrix operations.  
We first solve for l
iD
ρ∂
∂
and r
i
p
D
∂
∂
l C∀ ∈ , which allows us (4) to compute j
i
p j N
D
∂
∀ ∈
∂
. 
These are the cross-price responses for every node in the system when the output 
at generation node i is marginally modified. Finally, relative cross-price responses 
are obtained by dividing price responses by that corresponding to the generation 
node i i
i
p
D
∂
∂
. Assessing the relative cross-price response has the following nice 
feature:  
                                                
3
 lρ  corresponds to flow gate prices or shadow price of transmission constraints under nodal pricing. 
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Proposition 1: The relative cross-price responses are independent of the 
assumptions about the relationship between power output and net-demand 
responsiveness. 
Proof: Assume demand responsiveness to be scaled by X, then iα  is scaled by X and 
Di change but does not appear in (5) and (6). Equations (5) and (6) will continue to 
be satisfied if l
iD
ρ∂
∂
and 1
i
p
D
∂
∂
 are scaled by 1/ X. Hence any sum of both, namely 
i
i
p
D
∂
∂
, will also be scaled by 1/ X, and the ratio of two cross price responses scaled by 
the same factor 1/ X  stays constant.  
 
3 Application of the method 
3.1 The characteristics of the network 
We study the synchronized European electricity network corresponding to the real 
system operation in 17 electrically connected UCTE countries on January 17, 2001 
at 10.30 am. The UCTE model considered has 3,655 lines and 3,383 nodes of which 
708 are generation nodes, a total level of production equal to 244.00 GW, a total 
load of 240.86 GW and losses of 3.14 GW (Pérez-Arriaga et. al. 2002). Figure 1 
shows a map of the 17 countries comprising the system considered in the study.  
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Figure 1: Geographical location of 17 UCTE countries considered in the study 
Equations (5) and (6) provide the reaction of energy prices throughout the system 
to a change in the output at the chosen generation node i. The benefit of the 
marginal analysis is that we do not require any assumptions about the equilibrium 
price levels for the assessment of the relative cross price response.  
Lets illustrate the impact of network constraints at the example of a generation 
node located in central Germany (KKPhili). Figure 2 shows the relative cross price 
response at various nodes of the European network as result of an output change at 
KKPhili. There were some nodes where the change in price was very significant 
whereas in others it was negligible. Due to the meshed nature of the grid, prices 
changed all over Europe and not only in the vicinity of the generation node. It is 
subject to future work to assess the sensitivity of relative cross-price responses to 
the set of binding transmission constraints. In an unconstrained world prices 
would only differ due to transmission losses and hence be highly correlated and 
relative cross-price responses would be around one. It is subject to further research 
to assess whether the typical European congestion patterns can be used to set 
boundaries on cross-price responses between different nodes and regions.  
1i
i
dp
dp
=
1 0.53
i
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i
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i
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i
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Figure 22: Impact on energy prices of a marginal decrease in the power output of 
an agent located in Germany (node i) 
As could be expected, the price of energy at the generation node increased as a 
result of the decrease in the power output at that node. The absolute increase is a 
function of assumptions about demand elasticity and irrelevant in this analysis. 
Across the remaining nodes in the network, some turned out to have negative 
relative cross price responses. For example, if the power output at the German 
node KKPhil was reduced, the price at an Austrian node decreased. This effect 
might seem counterintuitive, but has been anticipated in the literature using 
analysis of simple networks.  
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Figure 3: Example three node network creating negative cross-price responses 
Assume in the three-node network of Figure 3 the transmission line between node 
A and B is congested towards node A. Then decreasing output at node A will 
increase price at node A and hence increase the scarcity value of the transmission 
line. Exporters from node B and C compete to use the transmission line. If the 
scarcity value of the transmission line increases, then exporters from C face a 
competitive advantage because their exports to A require a smaller fraction of the 
transmission line per unit of energy exported than exporters from B. Hence exports 
from B are reduced and price drops at B. Node B has a negative cross price 
response to output changes at node A. 
We studied in detail the case of one of the many nodes with negative cross-price 
responses. Some constraint lines in the real scale system played the same role as 
that of line ‘k’ in the example of Figure 3. It cannot be claimed that this example 
explains why we obtained negative cross-price responses for some of the nodes in 
the system. It demonstrates, however, that this situation is perfectly possible.  
3.2 Pre-selection of potential balancing points 
As discussed in the introduction, it is not sufficient to identify a node that has low 
relative cross-price responses. We furthermore require that the balancing point 
should be well connected to the system as a whole. This ensures that the energy 
price at the balancing point is representative of the general evolution of energy 
prices in the system. Otherwise price changes of transmission contracts would 
represent not only locational differences but also an overall evolution of the price 
level. This would imply that the ‘transmission’ contract could take both large 
positive and large negative values. Hence, the counter-party risk that the holder of 
the contract would default in the case that the contract takes a large negative 
value increases significantly. This implies, that larger and more robust credit 
guarantees would be required, which increases costs and is likely to exclude some 
agents from acquiring transmission contracts.  
Hence we need a criterion to judge how well connected a node is to the network. 
The own price response of a node represents the change in price at the node per 
unit decrease in the output at the same node. The larger a node and the better 
connected a node is to the network, the lower its own price response to output 
changes will be. If no constraints were binding every node would have the same 
own price response since all the system would respond to a change in the output at 
any node. This common price response in the absence of constraints is a suitable 
reference value to decide whether a node is well connected to the system. Only 
those nodes whose own price elasticity is below 10 times the unconstrained 
system’s own price elasticity were considered well-connected nodes. Hence only 
these nodes are considered as potential balancing points in the analysis. 
 
3.3 Node with optimal cross-price response 
This chapter outlines the main results of our search for a suitable balancing node 
for the European system. Figure 4 shows the relative cross-price responses for each 
node of the UCTE system when output is changed at the node KKPhil in central 
Germany. The nodes have been sorted by their relative cross-price response. 
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Figure 4: Relative cross price responses sorted by magnitude with the generation 
node located in KKPhili (Germany) 
As discussed in the introduction agents with significant share in generation should 
be restricted to own contracts that hedge their transmission risk. No generator 
should be allowed to buy contracts corresponding to an import to its node. We now 
set up the additional requirement that relative cross price response of the 
balancing point with respect to the power injection at the generation node is below 
1. This ensures that a generator reducing output will reduce the value of his 
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transmission contract. This ensures that ownership of transmission contracts 
reduces the exercise of market power at the generation node.  
The balancing point must mitigate the effects of market power at every node with 
generation assets. Hence it does not suffice to choose a balancing node that has low 
cross-price response relative to one German node, but we require that the 
balancing point exhibits low-cross price responses relative to all generation nodes 
of the network. Hence we should test for each potential balancing node, what are 
the relative cross-price responses it experiences to output changes at the remaining 
nodes of the network.  
On the horizontal axis in Figure 5 potential balancing nodes are listed with the 
maximum relative cross-price response they exhibit if 20,40,60,80 and 100 
generation nodes are considered.  
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Figure5: Effect of the number of generation nodes considered on the shape of the 
curve representing the maximum relative cross price response for each node in 
the system 
All the nodes with a maximum cross-price response below 1 mitigate the exercise of 
market power at any of the generation nodes considered. As the number of 
generation nodes under consideration increases from 20 to 100 the number of 
potential balancing nodes with relative cross price response of at least one increase. 
The more generation nodes we consider, the more probable it is that at least one 
generation node is very close to the balancing node and hence will have the same 
price and relative cross price response of one.  
In order to exclude this effect, Figure 6 depicts the value of the relative cross-price 
elasticity of a node, such that 1/20 of the values we have obtained for this node are 
higher (95percentile). The graph illustrates that for growing numbers of generation 
nodes considered in the calculation, there is no longer a trend of increasing or 
decreasing values of the 95%-til of relative cross price responses. However, to 
ensure accurate results we use in the subsequent presentation the results obtained 
with all 708 that are defined as generation nodes in the snapshot. 
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Figure 6: Curves representing the 95th percentile of the probability distribution 
of relative cross-price responses for each node in the system. Each curve has been 
obtained for a different number of generation nodes 
However, the approach of purely relying on the 95% creates the risk that nodes 
that may enhance market power could be regarded as being suitable as balancing 
points. Hence first nodes were selected that exhibited a maximum relative cross-
price response below 1.1. In this group, nodes were ranked according to the 95 
percentile of their distribution and the best 20 nodes were selected. Figure 7 
illustrates the combined selection process.  
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Figure 7: Election of the balancing point for the European system using both the 
maximum value of the distribution and the 95 percentile 
The blue line represents the 95 percentile of the probability distribution for each 
node. It is divided into two separate segments. As explained in the graphic, the one 
on the left corresponds to the nodes whose maximum relative cross-price response 
is below 1.1 (and therefore those which can be thought to mitigate market power in 
any case). The curve on the right side corresponds to the rest of the nodes. The red 
line represents the maximum value of the distribution.  
3.4 Discussion of results 
Figure 8 illustrates the geographical distribution of the twenty nodes that are well 
connected, exhibit maximum relative cross price responses below 1.1 and show in 
this group the lowest 95% of relative cross-price responses. Based on this analysis 
the best candidate is the node labeled ‘Langerak 132’ in The Netherlands. 
4 nodes
5 nodes
9 nodes 2 nodes
 
Figure 8: Geographical distribution of the 20 best candidates to become the 
European balancing point 
It seems surprising that the algorithm identifies Belgium and the Netherlands as 
suitable balancing points, given that transmission constraints to these countries 
are well known thus implying that the criteria that nodes should be well connected 
to the remaining system is violated. This could imply that the criteria by which we 
selected well-connected nodes were not rigorous enough. In fact, if the threshold 
used to decide whether a node is well connected to the rest of the system were to be 
lowered to 5 times the reference value (instead of 10 times as before) the 20 nodes 
chosen as final candidates would be located in France. Additionally, the criteria we 
have used to locate congestions in the grid is unable to capture some of the 
constraints that TSOs take into account when operating their respective 
transmission systems. Both (n-1) type security criteria and the lack of efficient 
coordination in the management of the scarce capacity cause the importing 
capacity into the Netherlands to be reduced from more than 11000 MW to less than 
4000 MW
4,5
 (Institute of Power Systems and Power Economics, 2001). Some of the 
binding constraints affecting the area have been considered (some within Germany 
and on the border between Germany and France). However, others on the borders 
                                                
4
 This would provide an additional argument for integrating different markets to ensure the network 
is used more efficiently while retaining the same level of system security. 
5
 The day ahead prices for the 10-11am on 17
th
 of January 2001 were 38.93 Euro/MWh at the 
LPX/EEX for Germany and 50 Euro/MWh at the APX in the Netherlands. This price difference 
indicates that available transmission capacity into the Netherlands should have been used. 
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between France and Belgium and between Germany and the Netherlands have not. 
Finally, more than one scenario is probably necessary to assess which are the 
relevant constraints. Changing regulations in most EU countries and the 
appearance of new trade opportunities between countries will probably 
significantly alter flow patterns in the European system. If the competing 
authorities decided to define transmission contracts towards a balancing point in 
the future, they should base their election on the possible flow patterns anticipated 
and not only the currently prevailing flow patterns. For example, the Dutch system 
operator, TenneT, states that it is possible that expected market evolutions may 
transform the Netherlands into a heavily transited country sometime in the future 
(Institute of Power Systems and Power Economics, 2001). Hence for an appropriate 
determination of the balancing point, the analysis should be repeated.  
However, we have presented results that are interesting in that they show how 
closely prices are interlinked in the European network, and give an empirically 
based perspective on network interactions between regional electricity markets.  
 
4 Conclusions 
Both market power considerations and the possibility of simplifying the secondary 
trading of transmission contracts make it advisable to define transmission 
contracts between any point in the system and a common balancing point. If a 
generator decreases its output, the energy price at the balancing point should not 
increase by more than the price at the node where the generator is located, if it is 
to be ensured that the contract mitigates market power. Relative cross-price 
responses were computed using nodal pricing equations. Based on these responses, 
we have chosen a preliminary set of candidates to become the European Balancing 
Point. Despite being preliminary, the obtained results prove that the application of 
the methodology presented in the paper to a real large-scale system is feasible. One 
additional conclusion drawn from the results is that, contrary to what might be 
expected, output decisions by generators affect prices all around Europe and not 
only in the area surrounding the agent. This fact can be attributed to the meshed 
nature of the European grid. 
However, conclusive results require further analysis. The effect that the selection 
of the set of binding constraints has on the results remains unexplored. The 
assumption that the net demand is proportional to the amount of generation 
available at each node should be reconsidered. More data on real demand levels 
would improve accuracy. Further analysis could also assess the impact that agents 
owning generation at different nodes may have. This circumstance may well affect 
the strategic decisions taken by agents. 
Finally, the paper has only explored the possibility of using one unique balancing 
point for the whole system. Different balancing points can be defined depending on 
where each agent is trading its energy. A local balancing point for each national 
market may complement the European-wide balancing point to serve agents 
buying or selling energy locally. 
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